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UNDERSTANDING THE EXCEPTIONAL AND DYNAMIC 
NATURE OF BOUMEDIENE RIGHTS TO COURT ACCESS 
ANDREW KENT† 
In response to Stephen I. Vladeck, Response, Access to Counsel, Res Judicata, 
and the Future of Habeas at Guantanamo, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 78 
(2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2012/Vladeck.pdf. 
 
 I appreciate Professor Steve Vladeck’s engagement with my Essay1 
about the future of habeas litigation for Guantanamo detainees. My Essay 
questions the Obama Administration’s recent statement that Boumediene v. 
Bush2 granted a constitutional right to habeas corpus that continues in 
perpetuity, allowing detainees to continue filing successive habeas petitions 
for as long as they are detained.3 I argue that the question of continuing access 
to the courts for Guantanamo detainees who have lost their habeas cases is 
significantly more complicated than the Obama Administration conveyed. 
My argument has two parts. First, I propose that the court-access rights 
granted by Boumediene could be held to have expired once a federal habeas 
court found a detainee to be an enemy fighter (a “judicially-confirmed 
 
† Associate Professor, Fordham Law School; Faculty Advisor, Center on National Secu-
rity at Fordham Law School.  
1 Andrew Kent, Essay, Do Boumediene Rights Expire?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 20 
(2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/10-2012/Kent.pdf. 
2 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2008) (holding that “[aliens held at Guantanamo] do have the ha-
beas corpus privilege” and that the procedures provided by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
do not provide an adequate substitute). 
3 See Kent, supra note 1, at 20-21 (discussing the Justice Department’s recent announcement 
that it would not contest such petitions).  
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enemy fighter”).4 In other words, Boumediene might be read to give the 
detainees only one bite at the habeas apple. Second, I contend that federal 
courts have a duty to inquire sua sponte whether Boumediene-based rights to 
court access still exists for judicially-confirmed enemy fighters because, in 
addition to involving individual rights and other considerations, court 
access under Boumediene implicates the federal courts’ subject matter 
jurisdiction.5 As a result, the executive branch may not waive this potential 
jurisdictional deficiency, and therefore, the Obama Administration’s 
concession is inoperative.6 I conclude, however, that there are some argu-
ments supporting continued court access for judicially-confirmed enemy 
fighters at Guantanamo, including important policy considerations.7  
Like the Department of Justice in its recent filing, Professor Vladeck con-
tends that if Boumediene was rightly decided, habeas corpus rights must 
continue in perpetuity for all Guantanamo detainees, including judicially-
confirmed enemy fighters.8 However, given the law prior to Boumediene and 
the precise holdings of the Boumediene Court, I think Professor Vladeck’s 
theory misses several key issues. In particular, the rights the Boumediene 
Court granted were both exceptional—that is, an exception from previous law 
and practice, which had denied such rights—and dynamic—meaning that the 
result of Boumediene’s test for whether to grant a given detainee these rights is 
changeable over time as the circumstances evaluated by the test change.  
Historically, the right to access U.S. courts and to claim protection un-
der U.S. law, including the Constitution, was limited by citizenship, 
territorial location, and enemy status.9 Enemy aliens (citizens or subjects of 
a nation at war with the United States), were barred from accessing U.S. 
courts during wartime unless they were resident in America and  had 
refrained from taking hostile actions against the United States.10 And all 
aliens who were outside the United States lacked any rights under the U.S. 
Constitution.11 Even if present in the United States (say, as prisoners of 
 
4 See id. at 31. 
5 See id. at 32-33. 
6 See id. at 37. 
7 See id. at 37-38. 
8 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Response, Access to Counsel, Res Judicata, and the Future of Habeas at 
Guantanamo, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 78, 79-81 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/ 
responses/11-2012/Vladeck.pdf. 
9 See Andrew Kent, The Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 26-27, 67) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kent, Fateful Turn]. 
10 Id. 
11 See id. (manuscript at 67); see also Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme 
Court’s Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 123-32 & 124 n.96 (2011); Andrew 
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war), enemy fighters lacked any right to access U.S. courts and any individu-
al rights under the Constitution.12 As Justice Kennedy, the author of 
Boumediene, once put it, “[T]he Constitution does not create, nor do general 
principles of law create, any juridical relation between our country and 
some undefined, limitless class of noncitizens who are beyond our territo-
ry.”13 There were always sharp limits to the scope of our constitutional 
community, and for noncitizens, access to U.S. courts and to U.S. constitu-
tional rights historically depended on being a civilian (not an enemy 
fighter) who was present in the United States.  
These rules came under challenge starting about the middle of the twenti-
eth century.14 And Boumediene was a watershed moment. As the Boumediene 
Court noted, “before today the Court has never held that noncitizens de-
tained by our Government in territory over which another country maintains 
de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.”15 The Boumediene 
Court did not reject the relevance of citizenship, territorial location, or enemy 
status in determining rights to court access or to individual constitutional 
rights. But the Court did reject the old, categorical, bright-line rules based on 
these factors. In its place, the Court substituted a multi-factor, nonexclusive 
test to determine whether a noncitizen outside the United States had a 
constitutional right to access U.S. courts via habeas corpus:  
[W]e conclude that at least three factors are relevant in determining the 
reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee 
and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination 
was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention 
 
Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 
1853-60 (2010); J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 
GEO. L.J. 463, 492-93 & 505 (2007) [hereinafter Kent, Global Constitution]. 
12 See Kent, Fateful Turn, supra note 9 (manuscript at 27-28). 
13 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
14 See, e.g., Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963-65 & 963 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (hold-
ing that the Fifth Amendment Due Process and Habeas Suspension Clauses protect “any person,” 
anywhere in the world, including admitted agents of the German government convicted of war 
crimes by a U.S. military commission in China and detained in U.S.-occupied Germany), rev’d sub 
nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950) (holding that the German petitioners lacked 
constitutional rights, including the right to access U.S. courts). 
Some scholars contend that Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), established that noncitizens 
abroad have judicially enforceable constitutional rights, see, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 305-06 (2d ed. 1996), but as I have previously pointed 
out, this greatly over-reads a decision which expressly confined its discussion to the rights of U.S. 
citizens, see Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 11, at 474-75.  
15 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008). 
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took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prison-
er’s entitlement to the writ.16 
When the detainees went to the Supreme Court in 2007 requesting a 
constitutional right to habeas corpus, they claimed to be innocent civilians 
who had been designated enemy fighters only through a flawed, administra-
tive review procedure.17 Thus, as framed by the Court’s test, the detainees’ 
claim was that, even though they were noncitizens outside the sovereign 
territory of the United States, the “status” and “process” factors favored 
granting them a constitutional right to habeas.18 The Boumediene Court 
agreed, holding that they had a constitutional right to have a federal habeas 
court evaluate their status using adequate procedures.19 My Essay’s conten-
tion is that, after federal habeas courts found the detainees to be enemy 
fighters—after they had their day in court and lost—Boumediene may no 
longer provide them with any continuing right to court access because the 
“status” and “process” factors now cut against them instead of in their 
favor.20 They are now noncitizens outside the United States and judicially-
confirmed enemy fighters who cannot point to much in the way of special 
factors supporting their continued entitlement to court access.21 
Professor Vladeck disagrees with this for several reasons. He claims 
that Boumediene is not a case about individual rights at all, but rather one 
that announced a structural, separation of powers–based rule.22 He also 
contends that “if Boumediene was rightly decided, it must necessarily 
follow that the federal courts have jurisdiction not only to entertain 
habeas petitions, but also to protect that jurisdiction by policing the 
ability of detainees to file future petitions.”23 In other words, Professor 
Vladeck appears to read Boumediene as announcing an unalterable, imper-
sonal, structural requirement that, so long as the Executive holds detain-
ees at Guantanamo Bay, those detainees have an inextinguishable right to 
petition federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus.24 
 
16 Id. at 766. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 766-67. 
20 Kent, supra note 1, at 31. 
21 The detainees can still argue that the place of their detention is far from any theater of 
combat and, while not sovereign U.S. territory, is under the uncontested jurisdiction and control 
of the United States. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755, 768 & 770 (emphasizing these points).  
22 Vladeck, supra note 8, at 79-80. 
23 Id. at 79.  
24 Id. at 81. 
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There are several aspects of Professor Vladeck’s analysis with which I disa-
gree. First, the ability of a given person to access U.S. civilian courts is a 
question of a particular individual’s rights, and U.S. courts have always treated 
it as such.25 More than once in Boumediene, the Court referred to detainees’ 
ability to access U.S. courts via habeas corpus as a “right” or a “privilege.”26 
Once properly in court, individuals can typically raise all sorts of claims. Thus, 
Professor Vladeck is correct that in habeas cases, detainees may simply claim 
that the government lacks legal authority to detain instead of raising a claim 
that an individual constitutional right, like Due Process or Equal Protection, 
has been violated.27 But it is not faithful to either Boumediene or a great deal of 
earlier precedent to suggest, as Professor Vladeck appears to, that courts do not 
evaluate a given individual’s right to court access but look only at nonindividu-
ated questions of constitutional structure.28 
Indeed, it is hard to understand Boumediene’s test for “determining the 
reach of the Suspension Clause”29 as doing anything other than looking at 
the specific legal status and factual circumstances of a given detainee and 
deciding if that particular person has a constitutional right to habeas corpus. 
As quoted above, the individual factors Boumediene highlights include 
citizenship, territorial location, enemy status, the process through which 
that individual status determination was made, and the like.30 The Court 
 
25 Though earlier courts used different language than they would today, U.S. courts have 
consistently said, in both habeas and nonhabeas cases, that the inquiry turned on the particular 
individual’s entitlement to court access. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950) 
(noting that “the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, 
only because permitting their presence in the country implied protection”); Mrs. Alexander’s 
Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404, 421 (1864) (“Mrs. Alexander, being now a resident in enemy 
territory, and in law an enemy, can have no standing in any court of the United States so long as 
that relation shall exist.”); Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 402 (1863) (applying “those 
principles of the common law, which suspend an alien enemy's right of action during war”); 
Dorsey v. Kyle, 30 Md. 512, 519 (1869) (explaining that “[a]s a general rule, an alien enemy is not 
allowed to maintain suit in the Courts of the country with which he is, at the time, in hostility”). 
26 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (referring to constitutionally protected 
habeas corpus as “a right of first importance”); see also id. at 739 (“[P]rotection for the privilege of 
habeas corpus was one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the 
outset, had no Bill of Rights.”); id. at 743 (equating the “privilege” of habeas corpus protected by 
the Suspension Clause with a constitutional “right”); id. at 768 (considering habeas corpus to be a 
“right[]” protected by the Suspension Clause); id. at 770 (“It is true that before today the Court 
has never held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another 
country maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.”).  
27 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 80-81. 
28 See id. 
29 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
30 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
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considered its decision to be a determination of individual constitutional 
rights,31 and there is no reason to challenge this assessment.32 
Second, I disagree with Professor Vladeck’s views that this 
Boumediene test for court access is static and that the right of court 
access conferred by Boumediene is ongoing and irrevocable.33 This is not, 
in my opinion, the best reading of the decision. 
As noted, the right conferred by Boumediene is exceptional. The Guan-
tanamo detainees were noncitizens outside the United States who, under 
pre-Boumediene law, lacked individual constitutional rights, including the 
right to habeas.34 Applying the multi-factor test, the Boumediene Court 
carved out an exception based on the specific facts of the Guantanamo 
detainees’ situation in 2008. If the facts justifying the exception change, the 
exception might no longer be available to detainees. 
And the multi-factor test outlined in Boumediene is dynamic, meaning 
that changing circumstances will lead to different results under the test. 
Even for a person who remains in the same geographic spot on the globe, 
every one of the Boumediene factors can change over time.  
 • “Citizenship”: Individuals can gain or lose citizenship based on both 
the government’s actions and their own.  
 • “[T]he nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention 
took place”: Even if the detainee stays in the same place, the nature of the 
place can change around him. Leased territory, such as Guantanamo, can 
be fully incorporated into the sovereign territory of the nation holding the 
lease, or the lease can be terminated and the territory can revert to the full 
control and sovereignty of its original owner. Within a war zone, territory 
can be gained or lost by contending armies—what was the frontlines can 
become the rear and vice versa. 
Further, over the course of a long war, many other legal and practical 
changes can take place. For example, starting in late 2001 with the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan, the United States was a hostile military occupier of 
an enemy state. Once a friendly Afghan government was installed, the U.S. 
presence had the consent of the host state and since then has operated as a 
co-belligerent assisting the Afghan government in its civil war against  
 
31 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
32 To be sure, the Court seemed to understand in Boumediene that it was determining in bulk 
that all detainees had a right to access the courts via habeas. But that was because all detainees 
were identically situated in relevant respects: noncitizens, but not enemy aliens, detained at 
Guantanamo, and determined by the same administrative procedures to be enemy combatants. 
33 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 81 & 85. 
34 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
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al Qaeda and the Taliban.35 By 2014, only a small U.S. civil and military 
presence will remain.36 For the thousands of enemy fighters detained by the 
United States in Afghanistan, “the nature of the site” where they were appre-
hended and have been detained has been changing drastically over the years. 
 • “[P]ractical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement 
to the writ”: The Boumediene Court’s analysis suggests that this factor 
overlaps somewhat with the inquiry about the “nature” of the sites of 
apprehension and detention, and involves looking at the military situation 
on the ground where the detainee is held, the potential cost and intrusive-
ness of judicial review into the war-fighting mission, relations between the 
United States and the foreign host government, and similar practicalities.37  
Therefore, as these factors change, the exceptional right to habeas cor-
pus for a noncitizen detained outside the United States could also change. 
And because the other Boumediene factors are dynamic in this sense, it 
should not be a surprise that the one factor I primarily focus on in my Essay 
is also dynamic. Returning to the first of the factors in Boumediene’s test: 
 • “[S]tatus of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which 
that status determination was made”: “Status” in the Guantanamo context is a 
shorthand way of referring to questions about either the detainee’s relation-
ship to enemy military organizations or other individual conduct which would 
make the person detainable. Status can presumably change based on the 
detainee’s renouncing or adopting different affiliations with enemy military 
organizations. Status can also change by means of the government’s status-
determining processes. This is the key change that has occurred since 
Boumediene was decided and the primary reason why I suggest that the 
Boumediene rights of those detainees that have undergone such status deter-
mination might have expired. Now that federal habeas courts have found the 
detainees to be enemy fighters, their “status” and “the process through which 
that status determination was made” have changed dramatically.38  
Applying the very test that Boumediene established to detainees’ changed 
circumstances today suggests that the constitutional right to court access 
 
35 See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary 
Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 
201, 216 (2011) (noting that the United States and Afghanistan are co-belligerents in an armed 
conflict against al Qaeda and the Taliban).  
36 Michael R. Gordon, Time Slipping, U.S. Ponders Afghan Role After 2014, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/asia/us-planning-a-force-to-stay-in-
afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the plans to reduce the American and allied military 
force in Afghanistan following the handover to Afghan security in 2014). 
37 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769-70 (2008). 
38 See Kent, supra note 1, at 31. 
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announced in Boumediene may well have expired for judicially-confirmed 
enemy fighters. The citizenship factors have always cut against these 
detainees, as does their apprehension and detention outside the sovereign 
territory of the United States. Now both the status and process factors also 
work against them because they have been confirmed enemy fighters by the 
federal courts’ habeas processes.  
I do not want to appear to overstate my points. My Essay identifies pos-
sible counter-arguments to my legal analysis, and Professor Vladeck’s 
response raises others. Further, I close my Essay noting various policy 
reasons that might support continued court access for judicially-confirmed 
enemy fighters at Guantanamo.39 Still, federal courts cannot avoid confront-
ing the question of whether Boumediene rights have expired for judicially-
confirmed enemy fighters because such expiration would strip the courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction. And there are solid reasons to think that the 
answer to that question should be yes, Boumediene rights do expire. Our 
Constitution and courts might properly be solicitous of individuals claiming 
to be innocent civilians wrongly detained by the U.S. military through 
flawed procedures. It is harder—not impossible, but harder—to see why 
that solicitude should continue when the individuals have been determined 
by independent, Article III judges to be members of terrorist groups 
engaged in an armed conflict with the United States. 
 
 
Preferred Citation: Andrew Kent, Response, Understanding the Exceptional and 
Dynamic Nature of Boumediene Rights to Court Access, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PEN-
NUMBRA 92 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2012/Kent.pdf. 
 
 
39 See id. at 37-38. 
